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Abstract
I develop a dynamic general equilibrium model to understand how multinationals affect host
countries through knowledge diffusion. Workers in the model learn from their managers and knowl-
edge diffusion takes place through worker mobility. Unlike in a model without learning, I present a
novel mechanism through which an integrated equilibrium represents a Pareto improvement for the
host country. I go on to explore other dynamic consequences of integration. The entry of multi-
nationals makes the lifetime earning proﬁles of host country workers steeper. At the same time, if
agents learn fast enough, integration creates unequal opportunities, thereby widening inequality. The
ex-workers of foreign multinationals also found new ﬁrms which are, on average, larger than the
largest ﬁrms under autarky.
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One of the most common arguments in favor of multinational (MNE) activity in developing countries
is that knowledge can thereby diffuse from Northern MNEs to Southern ﬁrms. This belief is reﬂected
in the widespread use of investment incentives by many host country governments to attract prospective
MNE investors (Oman, 2000). Yet, how does this knowledge diffuse to domestic ﬁrms? And what are
the consequences of such diffusion for the domestic economy? In an era of unprecedented globalization,
answers to these questions have taken on a great deal of policy relevance.
This paper presents a model that sheds light on the impact of MNE entry on welfare, wages and
occupational choice in the presence of knowledge diffusion through worker mobility. Speciﬁcally, I
develop a dynamic general equilibrium model, where agents have different levels of knowledge. Work-
ers and managers get together in ﬁrms to produce output and knowledge. Complementarity between
the worker’s and manager’s knowledge in the production and learning technologies leads to positive
assortative matching (or PAM), whereby more knowledgeable workers team with more knowledgeable
managers to produce and learn.1 The equilibrium is characterized by a threshold level of knowledge,
such that every agent below the threshold is a worker while those above are managers. The combination
of PAM and learning, however, implies that every agent who starts his life as a worker works for better
and better managers until he himself becomes a manager, provided that he survives long enough.
Globalization or integration allows managers to hire workers from other countries.2 I consider a two
country model, where the Foreign (or Northern) country has relatively more knowledgeable agents (in a
sense to be made precise shortly) compared to the Home (or Southern) country. Following integration,
new teams are formed as Foreign managers try to leverage their superior knowledge with respect to
Home workers. In this setting, I identify two effects that determine Home wages. First, integration
increases the competition for workers, which tends to raise wages. This is the labor demand effect. This
alone would make some of the incumbent managers worse off. But there is also a new effect: the entry
of MNEs creates the possibility for the workers to be matched with more knowledgeable managers. By
working for the MNEs, workers can learn and earn more than under autarky. The result that MNEs hire
more knowledgeable workers, however, implies that the less knowledgeable workers can expect to work
for the MNEs in the future only if they learn from the less knowledgeable Home managers, and this
creates a rent. Since learning is fully foreseen by the agents, the managers extract part of this rent by
paying lower wages and thereby internalize the knowledge “spillover”. This is the learning effect. If
agents learn fast enough, this effect dominates and the wage schedule shifts down by enough to make the
incumbent managers better off. The workers are better off too, because the increase in their continuation
1In their study of variation in management practices across ﬁrms and countries, Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) ﬁnd that
that the education of both workers and managers is strongly correlated with management scores; more educated workers are
hired by more educated managers.
2Inthispaper, MNEsaresynonymouswithinternationalproductionteams. Iabstractfromtheissuerelatedtotheboundaries
of international ﬁrms. For some recent papers which deal with this issue, see Antr` as (2003), Antr` as and Helpman (2004) and
Grossman and Helpman (2003).
1value outweighs the reduction in current wage. The above mechanism through which integration can
lead to a Pareto improvement in the host country is new in the literature.
The model is explored further in the numerical section. The learning dynamics of the model imply
that the lifetime earnings proﬁles of agents born as workers are upward sloping. The slope of the earnings
proﬁle depends on the matching function. By improving the matches, integration increases the amount
of knowledge that agents can acquire in each period, thereby raising the gradient of the lifetime earnings
proﬁles. This is a novel prediction that could be brought to data.
Since the distribution of knowledge is endogenous, the model also allows me to talk meaningfully
about inequality and how it changes following integration. Unlike most of the existing models, which are
conﬁned to studying wage inequality, aggregate inequality in this model can be measured on the basis of
per capita consumption. As is well known, inequality measures based on consumption or expenditure are
more appropriate than measures based on income. More importantly, a change in inequality in this model
reﬂects not only a change in the agents’ earnings but also a change in the entire knowledge distribution
following integration, a feature that is absent in static models of trade or FDI. I show that if agents learn
fast enough, integration can increase aggregate inequality.3 This increase in inequality is partly driven
by the fact that individuals in an integrated economy differ in terms of the opportunities they face. Even
if everyone gains from integration, the more knowledgeable workers gain relatively more as they have
immediate access to Foreign managers. These workers become managers and experience a jump in
earnings much sooner than workers who are born with low levels of knowledge.
Another novel prediction of the model concerns the spin-offs from the MNEs. Among the new
managersenteringtheeconomyeveryperiod, afractionconsistsofthosewhowerepreviouslyworkingin
other ﬁrms. I show that the biggest and most productive ﬁrms in the Home economy are, on average, run
by Foreign managers. Combined with PAM, this implies that founders of spin-offs who have previous
MNE experience are, on average, more knowledgeable than those who do not. Preliminary evidence
from Ghana provided by G¨ org and Strobl (2005) seems to conﬁrm this prediction. Furthermore, some
of these spin-offs are larger and more productive than the largest ﬁrms under autarky.
That MNEs diffuse knowledge through labor turnover is well-documented. In one of the more formal
studies, Poole (2006) provides evidence of knowledge spillovers through worker mobility in Brazil. The
literature, however, abounds with case studies and anecdotal evidence. Giarratana et al. (2004) look at
the spin-offs from MNEs that were created in India after the country liberalized in 1991 and ﬁnd that
the founders brought a high level of technological expertise from the MNEs to the new ﬁrms. In China,
many potential managers perceive the MNEs as schools where they can train themselves; many of them
leave to start their own business, once they have the required expertise.4 Easterly (2001) discusses the
Korean company Daewoo’s decision to train the workers of a Bangladeshi textile ﬁrm in 1979; most of
3See Goldberg and Pavcnik (March 2007) for evidence on episodes of globalization, which include both trade and FDI
liberalization, being accompanied by increasing inequality. IMF (2007) reports that inward FDI has exacerbated inequality in
developing countries.
4See “China’s people problem”, The Economist, 14th April, 2005.
2them left the parent ﬁrm during the 1980s to start their own garment export ﬁrms, laying the foundation
for the $2 billion dollars Bangladeshi garment industry.5 Despite being prevalent, knowledge diffusion
from MNEs through worker mobility has received relatively little attention among economists. This
paper tries to ﬁll the gap.
My paper combines two strands of the existing literature. Kremer and Maskin (2006) and Antr` as
et al. (2006) use matching models to analyze how international team formation affects earnings and
welfare. Those models, however, are static in nature, with the distribution of knowledge being given ex-
ogenously. I allow workers to learn from their managers, thereby extending the above mentioned models
to a dynamic environment. By imposing quite weak restrictions on the production and learning technolo-
gies, I am able to characterize the equilibrium of both the closed as well as the integrated economies. In
the process, I not only conﬁrm some of their results in a more general setting, but generate new insights
as to the nature of welfare gains, inequality and worker mobility.6
Monge-Naranjo (2007) and Beaudry and Francois (2010) develop dynamic general equilibrium mod-
els involving multinationals and on-the-job learning. Those models do not involve matching however.
A key feature of Monge-Naranjo is costly skill acquisition by individuals. By assuming learning by
observing within ﬁrms, I instead focus on matching and endogenous occupational choice. Therefore, my
paper is complementary to his.
In terms of the ﬁrm’s problem, my paper is closer to Beaudry and Francois. In their model, skills
are transferred from managers to workers through learning by observing. As in my model, ﬁrms offer a
bundle of wage and skill to workers, who trade current wage with continuation value. The authors are
primarily concerned, however, with analyzing why managers from developed countries may not relocate
to developing countries, despite a shortage of skills in the latter. This is different from my paper in that I
focus on the impact of MNEs on domestic skill accumulation and its consequences, assuming that there
are sufﬁcient incentives for foreign managers to relocate.
Despite similarities, my model differs from the above mentioned papers in one key respect. In
Monge-Naranjo (2007), workers get only one chance to learn (since he has a two period overlapping
generations model), while in Beaudry and Francois (2010), workers immediately become managers upon
learning.7 The combination of long-lived agents, PAM and stochastic learning implies that workers in
my model can learn throughout their lives and two workers with identical initial conditions can end up
with very different life-time earnings proﬁles. Besides generating richer dynamics at the individual level,
this makes it possible for even the less knowledgeable domestic workers to work in MNEs in the future,
5Evidence on founders of spin-offs inheriting knowledge from their parents in the U.S. economy is provided by Klepper
(2002) for the automobile industry, Klepper and Sleeper (2005) for the laser industry, and Filson and Franco (2006) for the
rigid disk drive industry.
6For quantitative models that compute static welfare gains associated with multinational production see Ramondo (2008),
Garetto (2008) and Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2009). Rodr´ ıguez-Clare (2007) develops a model of trade and diffusion
where growth is caused by technological progress. Unlike my model, however, diffusion of ideas is an exogenous process.
7Chari and Hopenhayn (1991) develop of model of technology diffusion involving learning by doing at the ﬁrm level. After
acquiring technology-speciﬁc skills, agents can choose whether they want to work as skilled or unskilled workers. Unlike my
model, however, agents in their model live for two periods.
3thereby opening up a new channel for welfare gain.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model while in Section 3, I
study the properties of a stationary equilibrium. In Section 4, I analyze how integration affects matches,
output and welfare in the host country. I study a numerical example in Section 5 and use it to further
characterize the equilibrium. Section 6 concludes. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
My model introduces learning and dynamics to a framework that is similar to Antr` as, Garicano and
Rossi-Hansberg (2006) - henceforth AGR. Time is discrete.
2.1 Preferences and Endowments
There is a continuum of heterogeneous agents with different levels of knowledge. Knowledge is em-
bodied in an agent, but can be acquired through interactions, i.e., an agent can learn from others. One
can think of knowledge as some composite of different attributes that affects an agent’s productive ca-
pability.89 A newborn agent draws his knowledge from an exogenously given distribution (k) with
support [k;k]. I assume that (k) is continuous, with (k) being the corresponding density. Agents also
die every period with a constant probability  and are replaced by newborns such that the population
is constant. The actual distribution of knowledge at time t is denoted by 	t(k), with  t(k) being the
corresponding density. Agents are risk neutral. Since the size of the population plays no role in the
analysis, it is normalized to 1.
2.2 Production
Firms produce a single, non-storable good. A ﬁrm comprises of a manager and production workers.
Workers do routine jobs and each worker combines with the manager to produce f(y) units of output,
where y is the knowledge of the manager. Thus, “f(y) captures the indivisibility of management-type
decisions and implies a scale economy because it improves productivity of all the workers in the ﬁrm,
irrespective of their numbers” as in Rosen (1982) p. 314. Notice that the productivity of workers in a
ﬁrm run by a manager with knowledge y is simply f(y). The manager pays wages to the workers and is
the residual claimant on the output.10
There is a technological restriction to the number of workers a manager can hire. The span of control
of a manager depends only on the knowledge of the workers he hires. This span of control is given by
8In the standard Mincerian wage equation, the right-hand side consists of education, as well as, experience. In this paper,
knowledge encompasses both, along with other unobservables.
9For a trade model where agents have two attributes, see Ohnsorge and Treﬂer (2007).
10Here, as in Monge-Naranjo (2007), I assume that there is no difference between the managers and entrepreneurs. For a
model which makes this distinction, see Holmes and Schmitz (1990).
4~ n(min
i
[xi]), where xi is the knowledge of the i-th worker hired by a manager.11 It is easy to see that
given such a technology, the manager will hire only one type of worker in equilibrium. I denote the
equilibrium span-of-control by n(x) and use this notation in the rest of the paper.12 Total output of a
ﬁrm is then given by
q = f(y)n(x) (1)
I make the following assumptions regarding the production technology:
ASSUMPTION 1a : f is continuous, strictly increasing and weakly convex in y; n is continuous, strictly
increasing and strictly concave in x. Furthermore, @
@y[
f0(y)






Assumptions 1a and 1b together imply that output elasticity of the managerial task is greater than that
of the production task at any knowledge level. As we shall see, this results in the more knowledgeable
agents becoming managers in equilibrium. 13 Assumption 1b also says that for a given knowledge
distribution, there should be sufﬁcient asymmetry between the manager and the worker’s contribution to
output. This is a technical condition required for the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.
The assumption that labor is the only factor of production is without loss of generality. Capital can
be easily introduced in the model. The cost of capital has three components - sunk costs, ﬁxed costs and
variable costs. In the absence of uncertainty in production and credit market imperfections, the ﬁrst two
do not really have any effect; so I just normalize those to zero. As for variable capital requirement, think
of it as being subsumed in f(y).
2.3 Learning
Agents also learn in ﬁrms. Since the seminal work of Gary Becker (Becker, 1962), economists have been
studying on-the-job training. In this paper, I abstract from formal training provided by ﬁrms and instead
focus on the knowledge that workers acquire while producing. I follow Jovanovic and Rob (1989) in
deﬁning the learning technology. Speciﬁcally, within each ﬁrm, a worker learns from the manager.14
Learning is stochastic and depends both on the knowledge of the manager and the worker. The random-
11This is similar to the O-ring production function (Kremer, 1993), whereby the workers in a ﬁrm are as good as their least
skilled counterpart.
12For an alternative micro-foundation of such a technology, see Garicano (2000).
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14Unlike Jovanovic and Rob (1989), learning is one-sided. Assuming that managers also learn from workers could be an
interesting extension and would be one channel through which growth can be introduced in this model.
5ness in learning does not necessarily reﬂect any randomness in the knowledge transfer process but rather,
is a simple way of modeling the heterogeneous capacity to absorb knowledge. A worker with knowledge
x at time t has knowledge x0 at time t + 1. The learning distribution is given by L(x0jx;y); x0 2 [x;y]:
For all h(x0) increasing in x0, I make the following assumptions about the learning technology:












The ﬁrst two conditions are the familiar ones for ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. These conditions
imply that expected learning is increasing in the knowledge of both the workers and the managers. The
third assumption says that there is complementarity in learning. Although the learning technology is
taken as given, it can be derived from a micro-founded model where learning requires effort and workers
optimally choose how much effort to allocate (see Appendix).
3 Equilibrium
Agents are price-takers. There are two prices in the economy. First, the managers hire workers and pay
a price for their marginal product. Second, the workers learn from the managers and pay a price for the
acquired knowledge. It is inconsequential whether there are two transactions within the ﬁrm or whether
the managers simply pay the wage net of the rent (Rosen, 1972). What matters is the net payment to
workers wt(k); let us call this wage. Note that the wage is a function of the knowledge of the worker,
but not the manager. I shall return to this issue shortly.
The absence of aggregate uncertainty in the model, combined with a large number of agents, implies
that the evolution of the knowledge distribution is deterministic. Since in equilibrium wt(k) is a function
of only the knowledge distribution, the evolution of wt(k) is also deterministic. Therefore, given an
initial distribution of knowledge 	0(k), a competitive equilibrium is characterized by a deterministic
sequence f	t(k);wt(k)g. Given a sequence of wage functions fwtg1
t=0; the manager’s problem is then
deﬁned recursively as
VM(y;wt) = max
x f(y)n(x)   wt(x)n(x) + (1   )max[VW(y;wt+1);VM(y;wt+1)]: (2)
where VW(y;wt) is the value function of an agent with knowledge y, if he chooses to be a worker
while VM(y;wt) is the value function if, instead, he chooses to be a manager.15 The value of a manager
15Notice the absence of time discounting in the above formulation. This is because a positive probability of death acts as a
6depends on the current distribution 	t(k) through the net wage schedule wt, where the dependence of
wage on k is understood. The second term on the right allows for the possibility that an agent, who is a
manager at time t, might choose to be a worker at time t + 1. VW(y;wt) is given by




where mt(x) is the knowledge of the manager who hires a worker with knowledge x in equilibrium.
The term within the integral denotes the expected value of the worker if he works for a manager with
knowledge mt(x). Depending on how much he learns, the worker might become a manager or continue
as a worker at t + 1. As before, this decision will depend not only on the worker’s own knowledge but
also on the wage function at t + 1. Let the disconnected sets of workers be denoted by Wi, i = 1;:::S,
where S is determined in equilibrium, and let W =
SS
i=1 Wi. Similarly, let the disconnected sets of
managers be denoted by Mi, with M =
SS








The left-hand side denotes the total supply of workers. The right-hand side denotes the total demand for
workers, where n(m 1(k)) is the number of workers demanded by a manager with knowledge k.
Over time, workers’ knowledge increases due to learning. But agents also die every period with
probability  and are replaced by newborns who draw knowledge from the exogenous distribution (k).
Birth, learning and death implies a rule for the evolution of the knowledge distribution 	t(k):





dL(s0js;mt(s))d	t(s) for all k 2 [k;k] (5)
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side denotes the fraction of agents who are born in period t + 1 with
knowledge less than k. The second term denotes the agents who remain below k in period t + 1,
despite learning from their managers in period t. Equation (5) implies that 	t+1 is determined by how
individuals acquire knowledge in period t, and the acquisition of knowledge by individuals is determined
only by who they match with at time t, which in turn depends only on 	t. Therefore, 	t+1 is a function
of 	t.
Deﬁnition 1. A competitive equilibrium of this economy consists of the following objects:
discount factor.
16For example, we could have the following allocation : W1 = [k;k1], M1 = [k1;k2], W2 = [k2;k3], M2 = [k3;k]. Then,
W = [k;k1]
S
[k2;k3] and M = [k1;k2]
S
[k3;k].
7(i) Value functions, VW(k) : W ! R and VM(k) : M ! R;
(ii) Current earnings, wt(k) : W ! R and t(k) : M ! R;
(iii) Matching function, mt(k) : W ! M;
(iv) Occupational structure, W and M, such that
(a) VW(k) and VM(k) satisfy the worker’s and manager’s problems respectively;
(b) mt(k) is the corresponding policy function;
(c) labor market clears;
(d) the knowledge distribution evolves according to equation (5).
It might seem natural to write the wage as wt(x;y) given that (a) the same manager can produce
different levels of output by hiring different types of workers and (b) the same worker can acquire
different levels of knowledge by working for different managers. Condition (a) suggests that the price
of labor should be speciﬁc to a worker-manager pair while (b) suggests that the same should be true for
the price of knowledge. In order to understand why wt(x) only has the knowledge of the worker as its
argument, let us look at the underlying mechanism that determines the wage function.
In this economy, every agent with knowledge y, in the role of a manager, offers a “gross” wage
schedule e wt(x;y) such that y is indifferent between hiring any x. e wt(x;y) is the wage offered by y
if there were no learning and captures the worker’s pay-off from production. The following lemma
establishes some properties of e wt(x;y).
Lemma 1. e wt(x;y) is increasing in x for all y, and @2 e w
@x@y > 0.
At the same time, each agent, in the role of a worker, offers a rent schedule e rt(x;y) such that he is
indifferent across managers. e rt(x;y) is what the workers would pay to the managers if there were no
production; it reﬂects the value of learning. The following lemma establishes a key property of the rent
function.
Lemma 2. @2e r
@x@y  0.
Unlike e wt(x;y), which is the solution to a static problem, workers compute e rt(x;y) by taking into
account the entire expected earnings proﬁle. As Lemma 1 and 2 shows, the gross wage, as well as,
the rent functions have positive cross partials. Each of these forces individually would lead to positive
assortative matching (or PAM), whereby more knowledgeable workers work for more knowledgeable
managers.17 Having both of them acting in the same direction re-enforces the result. This is stated
formally in the next lemma.
Lemma 3. mt(x) is strictly increasing in x.
Although PAM imposes some structure on the equilibrium allocation, the occupational structure is
still too general (recall that S, the number of sets of workers and managers, could potentially take any
17This is standard feature of worker-manager relations that exhibit complementarity (Becker, 1973).
8value). I claim that in equilibrium, there exists a threshold k
t such that all agents with knowledge less
than k
t are workers, while those with knowledge above k
t are managers. That is, I claim that S = 1.








t (s))d	t(s) 8k  k
t (6)
Note that the labor market-clearing condition is not standard. The left hand side denotes the supply of
workers in the interval [k;k], while the right hand side denotes the demand for workers coming from
managers in the interval [k
t;mt(k)]. Measure consistency requires that these two values be equal for
every k. This follows from lemma 3, since the workers hired by managers with knowledge in [k
t;mt(k)],






The above differential equation, along with the boundary conditions mt(k) = k
t and mt(k
t) = k,
allows us to solve for the matching function. As the following lemma shows, given 	t(k), the threshold
k
t and consequently the matching function is uniquely determined.
Lemma 4. For a given 	t(k), k
t exists and is unique.
A convenient property of this equilibrium is its block recursive structure - matches can be determined
completely once we know the knowledge distribution. One does not need to know the wage schedule in
order to determine the matches; rather, once the matches are determined, wages adjust so as to support
the matches that emerge. Of course, this does not mean that the way agents match does not depend on
wages. In this economy, wages (and proﬁts) not only determine the remuneration of the agents but they
also play an allocative role (Sattinger (1993)). But for the purpose of solving the model, the matching
function can be derived without any information on the wage function.
In this model, a worker with knowledge x working for a manager with knowledge y, receives
e wt(x;y) but has to pay back e rt(x;y). Accordingly, he earns a wage of e wt(x;y)   e rt(x;y). In equi-
librium, the worker earns e wt(x;mt(x))   e rt(x;mt(x)) = wt(x). Therefore, in equilibrium, the wage
depends only on the worker’s knowledge. PAM also allows me to derive some properties of the value
functions.
Lemma 5. VW(k) and VM(k) exist, are continuous and increasing in k.
This completes the characterization of the competitive equilibrium. The following lemma provides
for the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Lemma 6. There exists a , such that 8 > , a threshold equilibrium exists and it is unique.
9Finally, recall that equation (5) deﬁnes 	t+1 as a function of 	t. We seek a ﬁxed point of 	t, i.e.,
an invariant knowledge distribution 	. As the following lemma shows, such a ﬁxed point exists and is
unique.
Lemma 7. A unique, invariant knowledge distribution 	 exists and any initial distribution 	0 weakly
converges to 	.
Therefore, in the long run, the knowledge distribution converges to 	, with threshold k. Agents
who are born with knowledge above k become managers instantaneously. Since managers do not learn,
these agents are stuck with the level of knowledge they are born with. On the other hand, agents who
are born with knowledge below k start their lives as workers. These agents learn every period and
move up, until they eventually cross the threshold and become managers themselves. For these agents,
the lifetime earning proﬁles are positively sloped. For the remainder of the paper, I shall restrict most
of the attention to the stationary equilibrium of the model, although transitional dynamics are brieﬂy
considered in Section 5.
4 Analytical Results
In this section, I present some analytical results of my model. To simplify exposition, I make the follow-
ing assumption about the learning technology:
ASSUMPTION 2d : If, in period t, a worker with knowledge x works for a manager with knowledge y,
then in period t + 1, the worker’s knowledge x0 could be x with probability  and y with probability
1   .
Thus, learning is an all-or-nothing proposition for the worker. In the next section, I relax this assump-
tion and work with a more general learning technology. Notice that, in spite of the learning distribution
having just two points, it still satisﬁes Assumptions 2a, 2b and 2c.18
4.1 Autarky
I begin by examining the equilibrium under autarky. Recall that the density function for the newborn
distribution is given by (k): The learning technology, along with the newborn distribution, implicitly
deﬁnes the invariant distribution and allows me to solve for the threshold k.
Proposition 1. k is deﬁned implicitly by the following equation
18To see this, note that for any h(:);h
0 > 0, the expected value of h(x




























Proposition 1 sheds light on how the distribution changes as the rate of learning increases. , being
the probability of death in a period, proxies for the length of a time period. A lower , holding 
unchanged, implies that agents are acquiring the same expected knowledge over a smaller interval of
time. On the other hand, a lower , holding  unchanged, implies that agents are acquiring more expected
knowledge over the same interval of time. Both these cases translate into faster learning for the agents.
An increase in the rate of learning makes the knowledge distribution negatively-skewed, as more and
more mass shifts to the upper tail. Consequently, labor market-clearing requires that the threshold shift
to the right.
Recall that a worker with knowledge k produces f(m(k)) units of output. Hence, total output pro-













In this model, individual welfare equals the present value of consumption (or income, since the good
is non-storable) because agents are risk-neutral.
4.2 Integration
Integration, in the context of my model, means that managers from one country can hire workers in
another country, i.e., integration leads to the creation of MNEs. The managerial input is rival and as a
result, managers cannot operate plants in both countries.19 The motive behind the formation of MNEs
is exploiting differences in factor prices.20 In this paper, I focus on full integration, i.e., I assume that
19Whether managers travel from the source-country to the host-country or not, however, is irrelevant.
20This motive for establishing subsidiaries in other countries is the same as in Helpman (1984).
11MNEs are formed costlessly. In particular, I assume away any cost that might be associated with opening
a plant in another country. I do acknowledge that these costs are important, but the introduction of such
costs increases the complexity of the model without any gain in insight.
Let us introduce some notation. Deﬁne the subscripts i = fA;Ig, j = fH;Fg, where A and I
stand for autarky and integration respectively, while H and F stand for Home and Foreign respectively.
The Home newborn distribution is denoted by H(k) with support [k;kH], while the Foreign newborn
distribution is F(k); with [k;kF] being the corresponding support. I assume that kF > kH and that
F(k) ﬁrst-order stochastic dominates H(k). The latter assumption reﬂects the relative abundance
of more knowledgeable agents in the Foreign country.21 The steady-state knowledge distributions are
indexed by i and j. So, for example, 	A;H(k) is the Home steady-state knowledge distribution under
autarky. Ialsoassumethatthetwocountrieshavethesamepopulation. Withintegration, thefundamental







2F(k) for k 2 [k;kH]
1
2 + 1
2F(k) for k 2 [kH;kF]
(10)
I(k), combined with the learning technology, determines the integrated knowledge distribution
	I(k). The new threshold, k
I, would typically be different from k
A, the autarky threshold. Before
deriving the relation between the thresholds under autarky and integration, let us state the following
result.





H are the thresholds under G and H respectively.
Equation(10), alongwiththeassumptionthatF(k)ﬁrst-orderstochasticdominatesH(k), implies
that I(k) ﬁrst-order stochastic dominates H(k). In the benchmark case of no-learning, the knowledge
distributions in both the countries coincide with the newborn distributions. Consequently, under no-
learning, k
I > k
A;H (this follows directly from Lemma 6). With learning, however, the knowledge
distributions are no longer exogenous. Still, one can derive a relation between k
A;H and k





















21In this paper, I want to highlight the dynamic gains to workers in developing countries arising from the access to better
managers from developed countries. As Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) point out, better managers (or better management
practices, to be precise) are relatively more abundant in the U.S. compared to developing countries like India or China.
12The range of knowledge for the Home workers expands under integration. The agents with knowl-
edge in [k
A;H;k
I] switch from being managers to workers. The entry of highly knowledgeable Foreign
managers raises the opportunity cost of being a manager for a Home agent. This is not only due to
(possibly) higher wages paid by the MNEs but also due to the better learning opportunities provided by
the MNE managers. An incumbent Home manager weighs the cost of becoming a worker for a MNE
(forgone current proﬁts) against the beneﬁt (higher expected proﬁts in the future). For the managers in
[k
A;H;k
I], beneﬁts outweigh costs and consequently they switch.
Although Proposition 2 indicates the direction of change for the threshold, it says nothing about its
magnitude. In particular, the following two scenarios are possible:
Case I (k
I > kH) : In this case, every agent born in the Home country starts his life as a worker. The
support of 	I;H(k) is [k;m(kH)], despite the fact that, the Home newborn distribution H(k) still has
the smaller support.22 Though theoretically an interesting case, this situation is quite extreme because it
implies that integration results in the destruction of all incumbent ﬁrms (managers), who are replaced by
a new class of bigger and more productive ﬁrms.
Case II (k
I < kH) : In this case, the support of 	I;H(k) is [k;kF]. This case is characterized by the
birth of a new class of Home ﬁrms (with knowledge in [kH;kF]), who are on par with the Foreign MNEs
in terms of size and productivity. But unlike Case I, a set of incumbent Home managers with knowledge
in [k
I;kH] continues to operate in the integrated economy.
Whether we are in Case I or Case II depends on the parameters of the model. As long as kF is not
too different from kH, there will be some incumbent managers in the Home country.23 Intuitively, a
large gap between kF and kH implies that following integration, the Home agents have an opportunity
to work for very knowledgeable managers. This is also true for every incumbent Home manager, who
would rather work in Foreign MNEs, learn and become much better managers in the future than remain
managers with low levels of knowledge.
Irrespective of which case we are in, integration affects the matching of agents. An immediate
implication of Proposition 4 is that mI(k) > mA;H(k), where mA;H(:) and mI(:) are the matching
functions under autarky and integration respectively.24 Therefore, the least knowledgeable worker in the
Home country, and by continuity, a set of less knowledgeable workers, is matched with better managers.
This is formally stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 3. A positive measure of Home workers have a better match in the integrated equilibrium
compared to autarky.
22It is not the case that every Home agent is a worker. There are Home managers in [k

I;m(kH)]. This, however, means that
the Home managers in the integrated economy have knowledge greater than kH.
23Note that for a given kH, there exists a k
0 such that kF < k
0 implies that k

I < kH. This follows from the result that k

I is
monotone increasing in kF, and k

I < kH when kF = kH.
24To see this, note that mA(k) = k

A and mI(k) = k

I. Proposition 4 then gives the result.
13On the other hand, some of the Home managers are now matched with less able workers. Since the
output of ﬁrms depends positively on workers’ knowledge, the output of some of the Home ﬁrms under
integration are necessarily lower than in autarky.
Corollary 1. Under integration, the output of a positive measure of Home ﬁrms goes down.
Note that since the output produced by a worker depends only on the knowledge of the manager he
is matched with, the productivity of a ﬁrm, as measured by the value-added per worker, does not change.
















The difference between the two arises because in an integrated equilibrium, a part of the Home
output goes to the Foreign country as proﬁts of Foreign MNEs, while some of the Home ﬁrms may
become multinationals and earn proﬁts from their operations in the Foreign country. Finally, aggregate








To sum up, with integration, the threshold of the knowledge distribution shifts to the right. This
necessarily means that some of the Home workers are hired by more knowledgeable managers. These
workers also learn more compared to autarky. At the same time, some of the incumbent ﬁrms suffer a
decline in output.
4.3 Change in Welfare
Integration changes individual, as well as, aggregate welfare of the Home country. I focus my attention
on the case where there are surviving Home managers, i.e., Case II.25 In order to understand how learn-
ing affects welfare, ﬁrst let us look at the benchmark case of no learning. This is similar to the static
framework presented in AGR. A key result that emerges from AGR is that integration raises aggregate
25The reason for this is the following : If kF is very different from kH, then irrespective of whether agents learn or not,
every Home agent is better off working for the more knowledgeable Foreign managers. Thus we get Pareto improvement, but
the Home ﬁrms disappear completely.
14consumption, and with risk-neutral agents, the aggregate welfare of the Home economy. What about
individual welfare? In the previous section, we showed that the output produced by the less knowledge-
able Home managers goes down under integration.26 The actual change in proﬁts and welfare, however,
depends on the wages they pay, which would be different from those under autarky. Of course, as wages
change, the welfare of the workers change too.
Proposition 4. In the absence of learning, an integrated steady-state equilibrium with incumbent Home
ﬁrms can never represent a Pareto improvement relative to the autarky steady-state equilibrium in the
Home country.
In the absence of learning, integration creates winners and losers. The identity of the winners and
losers, though, will depend on the speciﬁc parameter values. If we think of workers and managers as two
separate factors of production, Proposition 4 essentially gives us a Heckscher-Ohlin like result.27
Does Proposition 4 continue to hold when we introduce learning? In order to prove otherwise, I
have to show that every agent in the Home economy is strictly better off under integration. Corollary 1
implies that some of the Home managers earn lower revenue compared to autarky.28 Hence, for these
managers to be better-off under integration, the wage bill has to go down more than revenue.
In this model, there are two forces that determine wages. First, there is a labor demand effect.
The entry of Foreign managers increases the demand for Home workers. At the same time, integration
increases competition faced by the Home workers from their Foreign counterparts. As shown by AGR,
(1) if the two countries are not too similar and, (2) if the span of control is not too small, the labor
demand effect raises the wages of all Home workers.
Second, there is a learning effect. A worker, in this model, can be hired by any manager with a
positive probability. Working for a more knowledgeable manager means higher expected learning and
consequently, higher earnings. Hence, the entry of highly knowledgeable Foreign managers raises the
continuation value of the Home workers. PAM, however, implies that the most knowledgeable managers
hire only the most knowledgeable workers. Therefore, the less knowledgeable workers can work for the
MNEs only if they learn and acquire enough knowledge from their current managers, some of whom
are the incumbent Home managers. A positive value of learning implies that workers are willing to pay
in order to learn. Thus learning creates a rent. This allows the managers to compress the wage. The
workers accept this wage reduction because they expect to be compensated in the future. So the learning
effect tends to lower the wage schedule.
The ﬁnal impact on wages depends on the relative strengths of the two effects. The following Propo-
sition shows the condition under which the Home economy realizes Pareto gains.
26This is true for both the learning and no-learning case.
27To be technically correct, we have inﬁnitely many factors.
28Since there is only one good, output equals revenue.





2f(kH)[n(kH)   n(k)] + n(k)[(kH)f(kH)   (k)f(k)]
(k)[f(kF) + f(k)]n(k)   (kH)[n(k) + n(kH)]f(kH)
where (k) =
n(k)
1+n(k) and (kH) =
n(kH)
1+n(kH).
Let us denote by 
, the set of pairs of  and  that satisfy the above condition. The left-hand side
of the above expression is positive by deﬁnition. The numerator of the fraction on the right-hand side is
positive too.29 For 
 to be non-empty, the denominator has to be positive and large enough. I can show




n(k) , i.e., the degree of asymmetry between the
manager’s and the worker’s contribution to output. Intuitively, the greater is this asymmetry, the greater
is the increase in the worker’s earning when he becomes a manager; and the greater is the wage cut that
the worker is willing to accept in order to learn.
Proposition 5 also sheds light on how welfare changes as the rate of learning changes. Assuming
that the right-hand side of the expression in Proposition 5 is positive, the inequality is not satisﬁed for
high enough  (or ). In the limiting case of no-learning,  = 1 (or  = 1), the left-hand side is equal
to zero. As  (or ) falls, the left-hand side starts to increase and at some point, exceeds the right-hand
side. According to Corollary 1, some of the incumbent ﬁrms produce less under integration relative to
autarky. For these ﬁrms to be better off, they must be paying lower wages to the workers. Corollary 2
follows naturally.
Corollary 2. If all Home agents gain from integration, some of the Home workers must earn a lower
wage compared to autarky.
Pareto gains are important for political economy reasons. Gaining support for trade or FDI liberal-
ization becomes much easier if every agent gains from integration. Notice, however, that proposition 5
compares welfare across two steady-states. It is possible that even though the new steady-state generates
a Pareto improvement, the policy lowers the welfare of some agents relative to autarky. In the next sec-
tion, however, we show that integration generates a Pareto improvement not only across steady-states,
but also at the instant the policy is enacted.
4.4 Remarks
Few remarks are in order. First, the rent-sharing in the model takes place without any bargaining be-
tween the workers and the managers. Rather, the division is determined by labor market clearing. Two
assumptions of the model are key for this result - ﬁxed supply of agents and endogenous occupational
choice. To see this, ﬁrst consider a model without learning. In equilibrium, the agent with the threshold
29Since
n(k)
1+n(k) is increasing in k:
16knowledge k earns the same wage and proﬁt and accordingly, has the same value from both occupa-
tions. Now assume that agents can learn. Can we have a situation where the workers extract the entire
rent from learning? No, because then the value from being a worker will be higher than the value from
being a manager for the threshold agent; although the current wage and proﬁt are the same, the contin-
uation value of a worker will be higher than the continuation value of a manager because the worker,
almost surely, will be a manager with knowledge greater than k in the next period. This, however, can-
not be an equilibrium since the agent with knowledge k, and by continuity, agents with knowledge just
above k, will strictly prefer to be workers. Given the ﬁxed supply of agents, this will create an excess
supply workers. For the labor market to clear, wages would have to be pushed down. The amount by
which wage falls for each worker is the rent that he pays to the manager. A similar argument shows that
managers cannot extract the entire learning rent either.
Second, if a MNE has more knowledge than an incumbent Home ﬁrm, PAM implies that the workers
intheMNEaremoreknowledgeablethantheonesintheHomeﬁrm. PAMalsoimpliesthatafterworking
for the (more knowledgeable) MNE, a worker never works for the (less knowledgeable) Home ﬁrm.
Therefore, there is no ﬂow of knowledge from the MNE to the Home ﬁrm. Despite this, the incumbent
ﬁrm could be better off if learning is fast enough.30 Of course, some of the former MNE workers set up
their own ﬁrms and these managers directly beneﬁt from the superior knowledge of MNEs.31
Third, knowledge in this model has only one dimension, i.e., it is completely general. I abstract
from ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge along the lines of Hashimoto (1981) and Carmichael (1983) among oth-
ers. Unlike Beaudry and Francois (2010), I also assume that the same knowledge can be used for both
production and management. This assumption is necessary for a key feature of the model - workers can
smoothly move from one ﬁrm to another, until they become managers themselves. This assumption,
however, can be relaxed without sacriﬁcing the tractability of the model. One can introduce a parameter
, where   1 measures the fraction of the knowledge that a worker acquires in a ﬁrm, that would be
useful in other ﬁrms. In this case, all the qualitative results would go through, but with lower welfare
gains. The scenario where all knowledge is ﬁrm-speciﬁc would correspond to  = 0. In this case, there
would be no movement of workers across ﬁrms just as in a static model.
And ﬁnally, Corollary 1 suggests that some of the incumbent Home ﬁrms will be producing less
following integration. If agents learn fast enough, the current earnings of some of the Home workers is
also lower (Corollary 2). Hence, simply looking at current wages or output might give the impression
that workers and ﬁrms in the Home country are worse off following integration when, in fact, they could
all be better-off. My model therefore suggests that one should interpret lower wages or output with
caution, especially when drawing conclusions about welfare.
30The traditional view regarding knowledge spillover is that workers with experience in MNEs are hired by domestic man-
agers. These workers bring with them knowledge regarding better technology and management practices and this raises the
productivity of the domestic ﬁrms. See, for example, Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004).
31This effect is similar to Monge-Naranjo (2007) where the transfer of skills from MNEs materialize in a new sector of ﬁrms,
not in the pre-existing sector of ﬁrms.
175 Numerical Results
(a) Welfare under autarky
(b) Wages under autarky
Figure 1: Home and Foreign economy under autarky
In this section, I parametrize the model and solve it numerically. The exercise serves two purpose.
18First, it allows visual representation of the results from the previous section, thereby strengthening the
intuition behind them. Second, it allows us to derive additional dynamic results which cannot be obtained
analytically. Throughout, the focus is on the Home economy.
The only change from the last section is in the learning technology. I assume that a worker with
knowledge x, and working for a manager with knowledge y, draws his knowledge in the next period from
a distribution which is uniform on [x;y]. The production function is given by f(y) = y, n(x;) = x.
Finally, I assume that the distribution of newborns is a truncated exponential in [1;k] with parameter .
By setting k = 1, the size of the smallest ﬁrm is implicitly set to two (one manager and one worker).
The following ﬁgures are drawn for  = 1,  = 0:5,  = 1, kH = 1:5, kF = 1:75.
5.1 Earnings and Welfare
Figure 1 compares the Home and Foreign economies under autarky. Figure 1a shows the welfare of
an agent as a function of his knowledge at birth. The only difference between the two countries is in
the distribution of newborns. In particular, the Foreign country has a larger knowledge support. This
translates into relatively greater endowment of more knowledgeable agents in the Foreign country.32
The less knowledgeable agents are relatively scarce in the Foreign country and hence, are better
off compared to their Home counterparts. But the most knowledgeable agents at Home are better off
compared to their foreign counterparts. The relative abundance of less knowledgeable agents at Home
translates into a Home wage schedule that lies below the Foreign wage schedule. Thus, labor is cheap at
Home and this motivates the formation of MNEs as the two countries integrate. In the previous section,
we had compared the steady-state under two regimes: autarky and integration. To compute the welfare
gains from the integration policy, however, one must compare the autarky steady-state equilibrium with
the integrated equilibrium in the period just after the policy is put in place. This requires solving the
entire transitional path.
5.1.1 Transition
With the policy in place, there is no immediate change in the knowledge distribution. Consequently, the
matches do not change. As soon as the policy is implemented, however, the agents’ expectations about
the future knowledge distributions change. Figure 2 shows the transition of the integrated knowledge
distribution from the time the Home country integrates until the new steady-state is reached. The initial
distribution is simply the sum of the Home and Foreign steady-state distributions. As shown in Figure
2, there are three discontinuities in the initial distribution. The ﬁrst one occurs at k
A.33 The second one
32If both H and F are truncated exponentials with the same parameter and kH < kF, then F ﬁrst-order stochastic
dominates H.
33There is always a discontinuity at the threshold. In a small interval to the left of the threshold (where all agents are workers)
there is both an inﬂow of workers and an outﬂow of workers. But in a small interval just to the right of the threshold, there is
only inﬂow and no outﬂow (since managers do not learn).
19occurs at kH, because no Home agents are born to the right of kH. The third discontinuity occurs at the
Foreign threshold. In the new steady-state, the discontinuities occur at k
I and kH.
Figure 2: Evolution of the knowledge distribution
The agents have rational expectations and know exactly how the distribution will evolve. Accord-
ingly, they know what the wages and proﬁts will be at each period during the transition. This, in turn,
allows them to compute their welfare in every period. Having solved the transition, I go on to study
the integrated equilibrium for different learning rates. Recall from Section 4, that keeping the learning
distribution unchanged, this implies choosing different values for .
5.1.2 Slow learning ( = 0:8)
In Figures 3 and 4, we compare the two steady-states: autarky and integration. In the steady-state under
integration (New S.S.), the welfare of individuals who are born with less knowledge is higher, while the
welfare of those born with high levels knowledge is lower, as shown in Figure 3a. Figure 4a indicates that
the incumbent managers have a worse match; every incumbent manager produces less under integration.
This is conﬁrmed in Figure 4b. Therefore revenues are lower. But the effect on proﬁts, which determines
the managers’ welfare, also depends on the wage bill.
20(a) Welfare
(b) Current earnings
Figure 3: Effect of Integration on welfare and earnings when learning is slow
The discussion in the previous section suggests that, the effect of integration on wages depends on the
relative strength of the labor demand effect and the learning effect. When agents learn slowly, the former
effect dominates and the wage schedule shifts up, thereby lowering the proﬁts, and welfare, of incumbent
21(a) Inverse matching function
(b) Output
Figure 4: Effect of Integration on matches and output when learning is slow
managers. This is shown in Figure 3b.34 Notice that I restrict my attention to the agents who are born in
[k;kH]. Although, in the new steady state, there are Home agents with knowledge in [kH;kF], but at the
34It can be shown that for  = 0:8, not only are there losers in the new steady-state, but the policy itself creates losers.
22time of birth, these agents still draw their knowledge from the Home newborn distribution, which does
not change with integration. Home agents attain knowledge in [kH;kF] through learning, not through
birth. Thus globalization creates a class of ﬁrms which are bigger and more productive than the “best”
ﬁrms under autarky. 35
5.1.3 Fast learning ( = 0:5)
Results are different when agents learn at a faster rate. This is displayed in Figure 5. Now, the learning
effect dominates the labor demand effect, thereby lowering the wage schedule. Although the output of
the incumbent Home managers fall due to a worsening of their matches, just like in the previous case,
the wage bill decreases by so much, that it outweighs the fall in revenue, resulting in higher proﬁts. This
makes the home managers better-off. The less knowledgeable agents are better-off too, as the increase
in their continuation value outweighs the decline in wages. This is true both in the new steady-state, as
well as, in the period following the policy implementation.36
5.1.4 Discussion
The above plots suggest that the incumbent ﬁrms experience a decline in output, irrespective of the
rate of learning. According to Aitken and Harrison (1999), FDI was accompanied by a decline in the
productivity of domestically owned ﬁrms in Venezuela. This decline, the authors report, is due to a
contraction in output of domestic ﬁrms due to the “market stealing effects” of foreign ﬁrms.37 In this
model, the output reduction is a natural consequence of complementarity in production and learning.
Under integration, the most knowledgeable workers are hired by the MNEs leaving less knowledgeable
workers to work for incumbent domestic ﬁrms. I call this the “worker stealing effect”. Despite this
effect, the Home managers are actually better off if learning is fast enough.
Evidence regarding the impact of multinational production on wages has been mixed. Aitken et al.
(1996) report that in Mexico and Venezuela, the wage spillover to domestic ﬁrms is negative and signiﬁ-
cant. On the other hand, Lipsey and Sj¨ oholm (2004) ﬁnd signiﬁcant positive wage spillovers to domestic
ﬁrms in Indonesia. In the previous section, we saw that if learning is fast enough, the wage schedule
shifts down. This result, however, is not inconsistent with the ﬁnding of positive wage spillovers. In
the above mentioned studies, the reported wage is the average of wages paid by all domestic ﬁrms. The
average wage depends not only on the level of the wage schedule but also on the distribution of workers.
With integration, as workers get matched with better managers and learn more, the mass of the distribu-
tion shifts to the right. This is conﬁrmed in Figure 2. Therefore, a lowering of the wage schedule and a
35The classic example is that of the Indian IT giant Infosys. In 1991, four employees working in the multinational Patni left
to form Infosys, which then went on to become one of the largest IT ﬁrms in India, as well as, the world.
36It can be shown that the evolution of the value function during the transition is monotonic. This implies that for  = 0:5,
agents are better-off compared to autarky at each period during the transition.
37With ﬁxed costs of production, foreign ﬁrms with lower marginal costs can expand their output at the expense of domestic
ﬁrms.
23(a) Welfare
(b) Inverse matching function
Figure 5: Effect of Integration when learning is fast
higher average wage can go hand in hand.
The numerical results of this section conﬁrm the analytical results obtained in the last section. When
learning is slow, integration creates winners and losers. In the above example, the more knowledgeable
24agents in the host country lose. But if agents learn fast enough, integration can make every agent better-
off. In this case, there is a decline in the output of the incumbent ﬁrms, as well as, the wages of the
workers. Therefore, a change in current wages or output could be misleading when it comes to assessing
welfare gains from integration.
5.2 Earnings Dynamics
Although the economy as a whole does not grow in the steady-state, individual earning grows over
the lifetime. Figure 6 plots the earnings path of the median worker for  = 0:5. The ﬁgure is drawn
under the assumption that the actual knowledge he acquires every period is the expected knowledge that
an agent with his level of knowledge would acquire. In the ﬁgure, the agent works for the ﬁrst three
periods and manages from the fourth period onwards.38 Under integration, a lower wage in the ﬁrst two
periods is more than compensated by the increase in future proﬁts. The lifetime earnings schedule under
integration is also steeper than that under autarky.
Figure 6: Evolution of individual earnings
Figure 7 provides an explanation for the greater jump in future proﬁts. It shows the distribution of
knowledge of the median worker after 5 periods.39 Following integration, the distribution shifts to the
right. On average, the agent becomes a more knowledgeable manager compared to autarky and hence,
his expected proﬁts are higher.
38Note that once the agent becomes a manager, his earnings do not change because he stops learning.
39Given the parameter values, the probability of the agent living for more than 5 periods is extremely small.
25Figure 7: Distribution of knowledge of an agent after 5 periods
5.3 Inequality
Figure 8: Consumption distributions
By generating a non-degenerate consumption distribution, the model also allows us to examine the
26Figure 9: Change in inequality
effect of integration on inequality. Figure 8 plots the Home consumption distributions under autarky and
integration.  is set to 0.5 as before. With integration, the distribution stretches out, as mass shifts to
the upper tail (The maximum consumption under autarky is 2.05, while that under integration is 2.77).
Figure 9 plots the percentage change in the gini coefﬁcient due to integration, as a function of . For
 = 0:5, inequality rises by about 40%. But this rise in inequality is not a general phenomenon. For
higher values of , integration actually leads to a reduction in inequality. Moreover, there is a monotonic
relation between inequality and the rate of learning.
When agents learn fast enough, integration gives an advantage to the those who are born as the most
knowledgeable workers. They work for the most knowledgeable Foreign managers, learn a lot, and in
turn, become knowledgeable managers in the future. Agents who are born with very little knowledge
continue to be matched with the less knowledgeable incumbent Home managers and accordingly, learn
less - learning ampliﬁes the initial inequality in the economy.
The above predictions could partly explain the experience of India since the early 90s. The annual
FDI inﬂows to India increased from US $ 654 million to US $ 3083 million between the periods 1993-94
and 1999-00 (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India). During this time, there has
been an increase in inequality, as measured by per-capita expenditure (Deaton and Dreze, 2002). This
increase in inequality has occurred not only across regions, but within urban areas as well. If better
managers hire more knowledgeable workers, and there is wide discrepancy in the knowledge levels of
individuals,40 then part of this rising inequality could be due to differences in opportunities faced by the
40In spite of churning out almost 400,000 engineers every year, only one in four of India’s engineers are employable in the
27Indian workers.
5.4 Pattern of MNE activity
Figure 10: Supply and demand for managers
As mentioned in Section 4, integration leads to the creation of a new class of Home managers, who
are as productive as their counterparts in the Foreign country. This can be seen in Figure 10 which plots
the supply and demand for managers at Home in the integrated steady-state equilibrium. The supply of
managers is simply the part of the knowledge distribution that lies above the threshold. Recall that the
upper bound of the Home newborn distribution is 1.5. Hence, there is a discrete drop in the density of
newborn agents to the right of 1.5, which explains the discontinuity at 1.5. The demand for managers is
obtained by looking at the number of workers of each type and the demand for manager per worker.41
Figure 10 suggests that, in the integrated steady-state equilibrium, there are Home managers who
are as knowledgeable as their Foreign counterparts. At the same time, the supply of Home managers is
not sufﬁcient to meet the demand. In the new equilibrium, some of the Foreign managers hire Home
workers and hence, Home ﬁrms and Foreign MNEs operate together.42 Figure 10 also throws light on
the pattern of multinational activity. The supply of Home managers falls short of demand, and there are
software industry (NYTimes, 17th October, 2006).
41The demand for managers per worker is simply the reciprocal of the span of control. This is a special feature of the span
of control depending only on the knowledge of the worker.
42See Markusen and Venables (1999) for the case where FDI leads to the development of local industry, but is driven out as
the industry develops enough.
28almost no Home MNEs in this equilibrium.43 Moreover, most of the MNEs operating at Home are the
best Foreign ﬁrms. Thus, the MNEs, on average, are bigger and more productive than the Home ﬁrms.
PAM implies that a worker in a MNE, on average, is more knowledgeable than a worker in a Home ﬁrm.
Therefore, the former employees of MNEs are also, on average, more productive managers.
InasurveyofﬁrmsinGhana, G¨ organdStrobl(2005)investigatewhetherknowledgespilloversoccur
through worker mobility. They combine information on whether or not the owner of a domestic ﬁrm
had previous experience in a multinational with information on ﬁrm-level productivity. They show that
ﬁrms which are run by owners who worked for foreign multinationals in the same industry immediately
prior to opening their ﬁrm, are more productive than other domestic ﬁrms. Using data on Danish ﬁrms,
Malchow-Mølleretal.(2007)showthatpreviousexperienceinforeign-ownedﬁrmsincreasesaworker’s
current wage. Both pieces of evidence are consistent with my model.
6 Conclusion
Despite both formal and anecdotal evidence on knowledge spillover from foreign multinationals, we do
not have a good understanding of, for example, how the distribution of knowledge changes and occu-
pational choice evolves as a country gradually integrates with the rest of the world. I believe that this
paper is a step in that direction. I show that allowing domestic workers to learn from foreign man-
agers not only generates novel predictions about lifetime earnings proﬁles and consumption inequality
among other things, ignoring the dynamic nature of knowledge diffusion could lead us to draw incorrect
conclusions about welfare. Much remains to be done, however.
As pointed out in the introduction, in order to focus on matching and occupational choice, I assume
that the transfer of knowledge is a costless process. In reality, ﬁrms spend a substantial part of their
resources on training their workforce. If there is some degree of mobility of workers, ﬁrms’ incentive to
train their workers might be affected, which in turn would affect the diffusion of knowledge. How would
the entry of multinationals affect domestic workers and ﬁrms in this setting?
This paper highlights a new channel through which domestic managers can gain indirectly from
foreign multinationals, even in the absence of any ﬂow of knowledge between them. But mobility
of workers from more productive multinationals to less productive domestic ﬁrms could be another
channel through which domestic managers gain. Workers with experience in multinationals could move
to domestic ﬁrms for various reasons. A domestic ﬁrm could lure a multinational trained worker with
higher wages. Or, in a frictional labor market, a multinational trained worker could accept a job in a
small domestic ﬁrm, rather than wait to be matched with a more productive ﬁrm. Whatever be the case,
domestic ﬁrms beneﬁt from the superior knowledge that these workers bring along with them. I leave
the examination of such interesting scenarios for future work.
43Here we follow AGR in assuming that, a manager will hire workers in the other country only if he strictly prefers doing
so.
29References
Aitken, B., Harrison, A. and Lipsey, R. E. (1996), ‘Wages and foreign ownership: A comparative study
of Mexico, Venezuela, and the United States’, Journal of International Economics 40(3-4), 345 – 371.
Aitken, B. J. and Harrison, A. E. (1999), ‘Do Domestic Firms Beneﬁt from Direct Foreign Investment?
Evidence from Venezuela’, American Economic Review 89(3), 605–618.
Antr` as, P.(2003), ‘Firms, ContractsandTradeStructure’, QuarterlyJournalofEconomics118(4),1375–
1418.
Antr` as, P., Garicano, L. and Rossi-Hansberg, E. (2006), ‘Offshoring in a Knowledge Economy’, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 121(1).
Antr` as, P. and Helpman, E. (2004), ‘Global Sourcing’, Journal of Political Economy 112(3), 552–580.
Barba Navaretti, G. and Venables, A. (2004), Multinational Firms in the World Economy, Princeton
University Press.
Beaudry, P. and Francois, P. (2010), ‘Managerial Skills Acquisition and the Theory of Economic Devel-
opment’, Review of Economic Studies 77(1), 90–126.
Becker, G. S. (1962), ‘Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis’, Journal of Political Econ-
omy 70(s5), 9.
Becker, G. S. (1973), ‘A theory of marriage: Part i’, The Journal of Political Economy 81(4), pp. 813–
846.
Bloom, N.andVanReenen, J.(2010), ‘Whydomanagementpracticesdifferacrossﬁrmsandcountries?’,
Journal of Economic Perspectives 24(1), 203–24.
Burstein, A. T. and Monge-Naranjo, A. (2009), ‘Foreign Know-How, Firm Control, and the Income of
Developing Countries’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 124(1), 149–195.
Carmichael, L. (1983), ‘Firm-speciﬁc human capital and promotion ladders’, The Bell Journal of Eco-
nomics 14(1), pp. 251–258.
Chari, V. V. and Hopenhayn, H. (1991), ‘Vintage Human Capital, Growth, and the Diffusion of New
Technology’, Journal of Political Economy 99(6), 1142–65.
Deaton, A. and Dreze, J. (2002), ‘Poverty and inequality in india: A re-examination’, Economic and
Political Weekly 37(36), pp. 3729–3748.
Easterly, W. (2001), The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the
Tropics, The MIT Press.
30Filson, D. and Franco, A. (2006), ‘Spin-outs: Knowledge diffusion through employee mobility’, Rand
Journal of Economics 37(4), 841–60.
Garetto, S. (2008), Input Sourcing and Multinational Production, mimeo, University of Chicago.
Garicano, L.(2000), ‘HierarchiesandtheOrganizationofKnowledgeinProduction’, JournalofPolitical
Economy 108(5), 874–904.
Giarratana, M., Pagano, A. and Torrisi, S. (2004), The Role of Multinational Firms in the Evolution
of the Software Industry in India, Ireland and Israel, in A. Arora and A. Gambardella, eds, ‘From
Underdogs to Tigers: Bridging the Gap’, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 207–235.
Goldberg, P. K. and Pavcnik, N. (March 2007), ‘Distributional Effects of Globalization in Developing
Countries’, Journal of Economic Literature 45, 39–82(44).
G¨ org, H. and Strobl, E. (2005), ‘Spillovers from foreign ﬁrms through worker mobility: An empirical
investigation’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 107(4).
Grossman, G. M. and Helpman, E. (2003), ‘Outsourcing versus FDI in Industry Equilibrium’, Journal
of the European Economic Association 1(2/3), 317–327.
Hashimoto, M. (1981), ‘Firm-speciﬁc human capital as a shared investment’, The American Economic
Review 71(3), pp. 475–482.
Helpman, E. (1984), ‘A Simple Theory of International Trade with Multinational Corporations’, Journal
of Political Economy 92(3), 451–471.
Holmes, T. J. and Schmitz, James A., J. (1990), ‘A Theory of Entrepreneurship and its Application to
the Study of Business Transfers’, Journal of Political Economy 98(2), 265–294.
IMF (2007), World Economic Outlook, October 2007: Globalization and Inequality, International Mon-
etary Fund.
Jovanovic, B. and Rob, R. (1989), ‘The Growth and Diffusion of Knowledge’, Review of Economic
Studies 56(4), 569–582.
Klepper, S. (2002), ‘The capabilities of new ﬁrms and the evolution of the US automobile industry’,
Industrial and Corporate Change 11(4), 645–666.
Klepper, S. and Sleeper, S. (2005), ‘Entry by spinoffs’, Management Science 51(8), 1291–1306.
Kremer, M. (1993), ‘The o-ring theory of economic development’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics
108(3), 551–575.
Kremer, M. and Maskin, E. (2006), Globalization and Inequality, mimeo, Harvard University.
31Lipsey, R. E. and Sj¨ oholm, F. (2004), ‘Fdi and Wage Spillovers in Indonesian Manufacturing’, Review
of World Economics 140(2), 287–310.
Malchow-Mø ller, N., Markusen, J. R. and Schjerning, B. (2007), Foreign Firms, Domestic Wages,
Working paper, NBER.
Markusen, J. R. and Venables, A. J. (1999), ‘Foreign direct investment as a catalyst for industrial devel-
opment’, European Economic Review 43(2), 335 – 356.
Monge-Naranjo, A. (2007), Foreign Firms, Domestic Entrepreneurial Skills and Development, mimeo,
Northwestern University.
Ohnsorge, F. and Treﬂer, D. (2007), ‘Sorting It Out: International Trade with Heterogeneous Workers’,
Journal of Political Economy 115(5), 868–892.
Oman, C. (2000), Policy competition for foreign direct investment: A study of competition among gov-
ernments to attract FDI, OECD.
Poole, J. (2006), Multinational Spillovers through Worker Turnover, mimeo, University of San Diego.
Ramondo, N. (2008), Size, Geography and Multinational Production, mimeo, University of Texas at
Austin.
Rodr´ ıguez-Clare, A. (2007), Trade, Diffusion and the Gains from Openness, Working paper, NBER.
Rosen, S. (1972), ‘Learning and Experience in the Labor Market’, Journal of Human Resources
7(3), 326–342.
Rosen, S. (1982), ‘Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings’, Bell Journal of Economics
13(2), 311–323.
Sattinger, M. (1993), ‘Assignment Models of the Distribution of Earnings’, Journal of Economic Litera-
ture 31(2), 831–880.
32Appendix
Micro-foundation for the learning technology : Suppose workers have to exert effort in order to learn. If a
worker, working for a manager with knowledge y, exerts e, his knowledge next period is l(e;y). For simplicity, I
assume that l(e;y) has the following functional form - (y)e, with 0 > 0. So all workers, working for a particular
manager, can potentially learn the same. Effort, however, is costly. Let us denote this cost by qx(e) with q0
x > 0.
Note that the cost of effort depends on the knowledge of the worker. I assume that q0
x(e) is decreasing in x. Let the
continuation value of a worker with knowledge l(e;y) in the next period be C(l(e;y)). If the Separation Theorem







de . The left-hand side of this equation is constant. Given the assumption about qx, it is
then straightforward to show that more knowledgeable workers will choose higher e and accordingly have higher
knowledge next period.
Proof of Lemma 1: Since y is indifferent along e wt(x;y), for any x1 and x2 we must have f(y)n(x1)  
e wt(x1;y)n(x1) = f(y)n(x2)   e wt(x2;y)n(x2). Letting x2 = x1 + h and re-arranging, we have e wt(x1 +
h;y)n(x1 +h)  e wt(x1;)n(x1) = f(y)n(x1 +h) f(y)n(x1). Using Taylor series approximation of n(x1 +h)
around h (small), we have n(x1 + h) = n(x1) + n0(x1)h + o2. Replacing this in the above equation, we have
[e wt(x1 + h;y)   e wt(x1;y)]n(x1) + e wt(x1 + h;y)n0(x1)h = f(y)n(x1 + h)   f(y)n(x1). Dividing by h and
taking the limit as h ! 0, we get
@ e wt(x1;y)





n(x1) . Since f(y)   e wt(x1;y) > 0 (in equilibrium, proﬁts must be positive) and
n0(x1) > 0, it follows that
@ e wt(x1;y)














Proof of Lemma 2: The worker’s optimization problem is given by
VW(x) = max
y
[e wt(x;y)   e rt(x;y) +
Z
VW(x0)dL(x0jx;y)]:


















VW(x0)dL(x0jx;y). The ﬁrst term on the left-hand side is positive (Lemma
1). The second term is also positive because of Assumption 2c and Vw(x0) being increasing in x0.
Proof of Lemma 3: I shall prove this lemma by contradiction. I drop the subscript t for simplicity. If we do not
have PAM in equilibrium, the there must be x1 < x2 and y1 < y2 such that m(x1) = y2 and m(x2) = y1. Then,
(y2) = [f(y2)   e w(x1;y2) + e r(x1;y2)]n(x1)
 [f(y2)   e w(x2;y2) + e r(x2;y2)]n(x2)
Similarly, we must have
(y1) = [f(y1)   e w(x2;y1) + e r(x2;y1)]n(x2)
 [f(y1)   e w(x1;y1) + e r(x1;y1)]n(x1)
Combining the above two inequalities and using the fact that n(x1) < n(x2), we can write
[e w(x2;y2)   e w(x1;y2)]   [e w(x2;y1)   e w(x1;y1)]
> [e r(x2;y2)   e r(x1;y1)]   [e w(x1;y2)   e w(x1;y1)]






@x@y . But from






@x@y . Hence, we get a contradiction.






























t (s)) (s)ds < 0, while L(k) =
R k










t) > 0. Hence, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, 9 a unique k
t such that L(k
t) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 5: The value function for the manager is given by
VM(k;wt) = max
x ff(k)n(x)   wt(x)n(x)g + (1   )max[VW(k;wt+1);VM(k;wt+1)]
The value function for the worker is given by




Deﬁne the vector function V = [VM(k;wt) VW(k;wt)]0. Then maxfVW;VMg = maxf[1 0]V;[0 1]V g. Also,
deﬁne  = [max
x ff(k)n(x)   wt(x)n(x)g wt(k)]0. Then we have the following equation:
V =  + (1   )
2
4
maxf[1 0]V;[0 1]V g
mt(k) R
k




It can be established, using Blackwell’s Sufﬁciency Conditions, that the operator T is a contraction in the
space of continuous vector functions with norm max[supk jVM(k)j;supk jVW(k)j]. Therefore, a ﬁxed point of V
exists and is unique.
To prove that VW(k) is increasing in k, note that if V 0
W(k) < 0, a worker will choose not to learn because
learning reduces his continuation value. If workers do not learn, they do not pay rent. Consequently, the only
payment that is made is wage and we are back to the static framework. But then more knowledgeable agents earn
more and V 0
W(k) > 0 trivially. Thus, we get a contradiction. It can be proved in a similar fashion that V 0
M(k) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 6: First, let us derive the equilibrium conditions for a threshold equilibrium. Since k
t is indif-
ferent between being a worker and a manager, we must have VW(k
t;wt) = VM(k
t;wt). Furthermore, for k
t to
be the threshold, it must be the case that k cannot hire k
t +  and be strictly better-off. If k
t +  is a manager,
he earns VM(k
t + ). In order to hire k
t + , the manager has to pay him a wage such that he is just indifferent
between being a manager and a worker. Let this wage be !. ! should satisfy
! + (1   )
Z
VM(k)dL(kj;k
t + ;k) = VM(k
t + )
34Therefore, period proﬁt of k if he hires k
t +  is given by
k
t +(k) = (f(k)   !)n(k
t + )
= f(k)n(k
t + )   n(k
t + )(VM(k




























t)   (1   )
Z
VM(k)dL(kj;k;k)

















t is the threshold, max[VW(k);VM(k)] = VM(k) 8k  k



























t)   V 0
M(k








t)   V 0
M(k
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@ < 0 implies that
V 0
W(k
t) < V 0
M(k
t)
The above condition needs to be satisﬁed for k
t to be the equilibrium threshold. We shall prove this proposition
in a slightly different way. First, we shall prove the existence of the threshold equilibrium, assuming that the equi-
librium is unique. Then we shall show that the sufﬁcient condition for existence is also sufﬁcient for uniqueness.
By assuming uniqueness, we are basically assuming that the set of workers and managers has to be connected
in equilibrium (See AGR). Given that there exists a unique market-clearing threshold k
t, we check whether the
threshold satisﬁes the equilibrium condition V 0
W(k
t) < V 0
M(k


























where the second line follows from the manager’s proﬁt-maximization condition. Therefore, for k to be an
equilibrium, it must be the case that
(f(k)   w(k))n0(k)
n(k)

















f0(k)n(k), or f(k)n0(k)  f0(k)n(k), since n(k)  1.
But f(k)n0(k)  f(k)n0(k) (* n00(:)  0) and f0(k)n(k)  f0(k)n(k) (because n00(:)  0). Hence, it
follows that
f(k)n0(k)  f(k)n0(k)  f0(k)n(k)  f0(k)n(k)
where the inequality in the middle follows from Assumption 3. Thus for  = 1, the condition on technology is




since this term is positive by assumption on the learning technology. This term is endogenous and it depends on
the invariant distribution, which in turn is determined by the learning distribution. This term is bounded above,






Deﬁne  as the value of  that satisﬁes
f(k)n0(k) + (1   ) = f0(k)n(k)
This can be re-written as
n0(k)
n(k)












f(k) implies that  < 1. Hence 8 2 [;1], we have
f(k)n0(k) + (1   )  f0(k)n(k)
Thus,




VM(k)dL(kjk;k))  f(k)n0(k) + (1   )
 f0(k)n(k)
 f0(k)n(k)
36  1 implies that f0(k)n(k)  1
f0(k)n(k). Therefore,








This completes our proof about the existence of equilibrium. As mentioned before, showing uniqueness entails
showing that the set of workers and managers is connected. Suppose not. WLOG let us assume that the knowledge
distribution has the following partition - ([k;k1];[k1;k2];[k2;k3];[k3;k4]). Workers in [k;k1] work for managers
in [k1;k2] while workers in [k2;k3] work for managers in [k3;k4]. For this to be an equilibrium, it must be the case
that k2 must be indifferent between being a worker and a manager. In other words, a deviation involving k3 hiring
k2   should not make both k3 and k2   better off. Using a similar logic as developed above, one can show that
that the condition for equilibrium is V 0
W(k2) > V 0






f(k) , then for  high
enough, this condition will always be violated. Therefore, an allocation with disconnected sets of workers and
managers can never be sustained as an equilibrium implying that the only equilibrium is the threshold equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 7: There is an alternative way of looking at the evolution of knowledge. Let A be any Borel set















d(s) if k 2 M
Suppose P is monotone, has the Feller property and satisﬁes a mixing condition. Then P has a unique, invariant
probability measure 	 (Stokey, Lucas with Prescott, 1989). Deﬁne the operator T as
(Tf)(k) =
Z
f(k0)P(k;dk0); all k 2 [k;k]
where f : [k;k] ! R is a bounded function. If f is non-decreasing, then the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance
property of the learning distribution implies that Tf is also non-decreasing. (Monotone Property) It is straight-
forward to verify that if f is bounded and continuous, then the same holds for Tf; i.e., T : C(k) ! C(k) (Feller
Property). The mixing condition requires that 9c 2 [k;k];  > 0 and N  1 such that PN(k;[c;k])   and
PN([k;c];k])  . Choose k0 2 [k;k]. Deﬁne 1 =
R
[k0;k] d	N(s) and 2 =
R
[k;k0] d	N(s). By the assumption
on 	N(:), we know that both these objects are greater than 0. Choose  =  minf1;2g and N = 1. Then
P(k;[k0;k])   and P([k;k0];k])  . Therefore all the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the
invariant distribution are satisﬁed.
Proof of Proposition 1: Let the number of people being born every period be normalized to 1. Cohort t at time
t are all newborns. All agents in [k;k




k H(k)dk. A worker
with knowledge k demands 1






n(k;)dk. The supply of cohort t managers is simply the measure of agents in [k
A;kH]. This is given by
R kH
k
A H(k)dk. Let us consider the distribution of cohort t   1 agents at time t. A fraction 1    of every type of
agent in [k;k
A] survive in period t. Out of the ones that survive, a fraction  of every type of agent do not learn







Similarly, a fraction 1    of the cohort t   1 managers in [k





k H(k)dk agents move into this interval from [k;k
A]: They are the cohort t 1 agents
who were workers in period t 1 but become managers in period t: Therefore, the supply of cohort t 1 managers
is (1   )[
R kH
k




k H(k)dk]. The supply and demand for managers in other cohorts can be
obtained in a similar fashion. Adding up the demand for managers and the supply of managers in each cohort, we
37get
Demand for managers =
1








Supply of managers =
1
(1   (1   ))










In equilibrium, supply must equal demand. Equating the above two expressions and after a bit of algebra, we















In order to derive the properties of k



























































































Proof of Lemma 8: Let G f.o.s.d. H. Let g and h be the corresponding densities. Also, let (k) be the demand
for manager per worker, where the worker has knowledge k. Since the span of control is only a function of the
worker’s knowledge, a worker with knowledge k works in a ﬁrm of size n(k). Hence (k) is simply the reciprocal
of n(k). Therefore 0(k) < 0 (this follows from n0(k) > 0). Also, let k be the threshold under H.
We shall prove the lemma by contradiction. Let k also be the threshold for G. We can have two possibil-






k (k)h(k)dk = demand for managers under H. But the supply of managers under G = 1   G(k) >
1   H(k) =supply of managers under H. Hence at k, there is an excess supply of managers under G. This
means that the threshold for G must be greater than k. (ii) There are n intervals Ai  [k;k], i = 1;:::::n such
38that
g(k) > h(k)8k 2 Ai;8i
g(k) < h(k) otherwise
Rank the Ais such that Ai < Aj ) maxAi < minAj. We proceed as follows - We know that k < minA1 =
a1(say) (otherwise H would f.o.s.d. G). Let B = [k;a1]. Then it must be the case that g(k) < h(k) for all k 2 B.













Re-arranging the above equation,
Z
A1




Multiplying both sides by (a1),
Z
A1




Now, 0(k) < 0 implies that (a1) < (k)8k 2 B and (a1) > (k)8k 2 A1. Replacing (a1) in the above
equation, Z
A1

















The LHS and the RHS are the demand for managers by workers in B [ A1 under G1 and G2 respectively.
Deﬁne maxA1 = a0
1 and minA2 = a2. Let C = [a0




























[g(k)   h(k)]dk < (
Z
B
[h(k)   g(k)]dk  
Z
A1




Multiplying both sides by (a2),
Z
A2
(a2)[g(k)   h(k)]dk < (a2)(
Z
B
[h(k)   g(k)]dk  
Z
A1




Since 0(k) < 0; we have
Z
A2
(k)[g(k)   h(k)]dk < (a2)(
Z
B






























Re-arranging gives us that the demand for managers by workers in B [A1 [C [A2 under G is less than that
under H. We can repeat this argument by expanding the set till we reach k. But then we have shown that the
demand for managers under G is less than that under H. However the supply of managers under G is greater than
that under H. Therefore, at k, there is an excess supply of managers under G. Hence the threshold under G has
to be greater than k.
Proof of Proposition 2: The derivation of the threshold is the same as in the proof of Proposition 3. Equating the














































Not that the LHS is the excess demand for managers in the Home country if the threshold is k
I, while the
RHS is the excess supply of managers in the Foreign country if the threshold is k
I. If k
I = k

































A, the RHS is positive. But this means that k
I 6= k
A. In particular, since the LHS is
increasing in k
I and the RHS is decreasing, it must be the case that k
I > k
A.
Proof of Proposition 4: We know that an allocation A is a Pareto improvement over allocation B if u(xA
i ) 
u(xB
i ) for all i, and u(xA
j ) > u(xB
j ) for some j: This suggests that in order to show that A is not a Pareto
improvement over B, it is sufﬁcient to show that 9 individuals 1 and 2 s.t. u(xA
1 )  u(xB
1 ) ) u(xA
2 ) < u(xB
2 )




40where NL refers to no-learning. If there are incumbent ﬁrms in the Home economy, this also means that
k
I;NL < kH
The above inequality suggests that under Integration, there are incumbent Home managers who continue to
operate (k 2 [k
I;NL;kH]). At the same time, under Autarky, m
 1
A;NL(k




(follows from PAM). While under Integration, m
 1
A;NL(k
I;NL) = k, i.e., under Integration, the manager with
knowledge k
I;NL has a worse match. The present value of k


















I;NL) wI;NL(k))n(k). Therefore, the relation between A;NL(k
I;NL) and
I;NL(k
I;NL) depends on the relation between wA;NL(k) and wI;NL(k). Let us consider the following cases -
(a) wA;NL(k) < wI;NL(k) : In this case, A;NL(k
I;NL) > I;NL(k
I;NL) ) k is strictly better-off under
Integration but k
I;NL is strictly worse-off.




better-off under Integration but k is strictly worse-off.
(c) wA;NL(k) = wI;NL(k) : In this case, A;NL(k
I;NL)  I;NL(k
I;NL). This is not a negation of Pareto
improvement. However let us choose the agent with knowledge k
I;NL +  such that m
 1
I;NL(k




I;NL + ). Since m(:) is continuous, we can always ﬁnd such an . Moreover, since m(:) is a function,
its inverse must be strictly monotonic. Hence m
 1
I;NL(k
I;NL + ) > m
 1
I;NL(k












Combined with wA;NL(k) = wI;NL(k), this means that in the neighborhood of k = k, wA;NL(k) <
wI;NL(k). Hence,
A;NL(k
I;NL + ) = (f(k















Using the fact that wA;NL(k
I;NL + ) < wI;NL(k
I;NL + ), we have
A;NL(k
I;NL + ) > (f(k






I;NL + )) = I;NL(k
I;NL + )
Therefore k
I;NL +  is strictly worse-off. Hence, for all the 3 cases (a), (b) and (c), we have shown that at
least one individual is worse-off. Since these cases are exhaustive, the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 5: We shall proceed as follows - First, we shall ﬁnd the condition under which kH is better-off
under Integration. Since kH is a manager under both Autarky and Integration, we have to show that VM;I(kH) >
VM;A(kH). Since kH is matched with k
A under Autarky and e k under Integration, this implies that
[f(kH)   wA(k
A)]n(k
A) < [f(kH)   wI(e k)]n(e k)
Re-arranging, we have
f(kH)[n(k
A)   n(e k)] < wA(k
A)n(k




A)   wI(e k)n(e k) =




















































































































Replacing them in the above equation,
wA(k
A)n(k
A)   wI(e k)n(e k) >























A)   n(e k)] < f(kH)[n(kH)   n(k)]
= B(say)
Hence the sufﬁcient condition for kH to be strictly better-off under Integration is that A > B. After a bit of





2f(kH)[n(kH)   n(k)] + n(k)[(kH)f(kH)   (k)f(k)]
(k)[f(kF) + f(k)]n(k)   (kH)[n(k) + n(kH)]f(kH)
42where (k) =
n(k)
1+n(k) and (kH) =
n(kH)
1+n(kH). Of course, this only ensures that kH is strictly better off. We need
to show that every Home agent can be made better off.
Notice that for k 2 [k;k
A], agents are workers under both regimes. For k 2 [k
A;k
I], agents are workers under
Integration but managers under Autarky. Finally for k 2 [k
I;kH], agents are managers under both regimes. In the
steady-state, VM;i(k) = 1
























M;I(k) < V 0
M;A(k)
Suppose VM;I(kH) > VM;A(kH). Since VM;A(:) is decreasing at a faster rate than VM;I(:) in the neighborhood
[k
I;kH], this implies that VM;I(k) > VM;A(k) for k 2 [k








 + (1   )(1   )
wI(k) +
(1   )(1   )





 + (1   )(1   )
f(mI(k))n0(k) +
(1   )(1   )







A (k)). When = 1;V 0





























M;A(k) > V 0
W;I(k). Therefore, 9 1 s.t. 8 > 1, V 0
M;A(k) > V 0
W;I(k) and hence VW;I(k) > VM;A(k)
for k 2 [k
A;k
I]. In particular, VW;I(k
A) > VM;A(k





 + (1   )(1   )
f(mA(k))n0(k) +
(1   )(1   )







 + (1   )(1   )
f(mI(k))n0(k) +
(1   )(1   )
( + (1   )(1   ))
f0(mI(k))n(k)m0
I(k)
When  = 1, V 0
W;A(k) = f(mA(k))n0(k) > f(mI(k))n0(k) = V 0
W;I(k). Therefore, 9 2 s.t. 8 > 2;
V 0
W;A(k) > V 0
W;I(k) and hence VW;I(k) > Vw;A(k) for k 2 [k
A;k
I]. Hence, if we choose  = maxf1;2g;
8 > ; VW;I(k) > Vw;A(k) for k 2 [k;kH].
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